By Sannat Odhrani
In Early August, telecommunications companies AzerTelecom and Kazakhtelecom from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan respectively, successfully laid the first fibre-optic cable across the Caspian Sea, marking the completion of the Trans-Caspian Fiber-Optic Cable project. This crucial milestone is a part of Azerbaijan’s Digital Silk Way scheme, which seeks to create a digital corridor between Europe and Asia.
The arteries of the Internet – fibre-optic cables – run across oceans, connecting billions, spanning millions of kilometres in length, and carrying approximately 99% of the world’s Internet traffic. Fibre-optic cables, not to be confused with power cables that also travel underwater, are a type of cable that can be laid across water bodies to establish digital connectivity. They are frequently referred to as subsea cables. As simplistic as laying physical wires across the Earth to connect people sounds, constructing and laying fibre-optic cables underwater and connecting them to land remains the preferred way to provide the physical infrastructure necessary for digital communication. It’s partially thanks to their low long-term cost compared to other technology that promises to keep people connected, like satellites.
The way cables are laid across seabeds is highly instructive; they’re constantly affected by the current international order and any changes to it, interstate relations, new technology, markets, and non-state actors.
This vulnerability has meant many political commentators have pointed to the worrying absence of international legal frameworks to protect the physical infrastructure upon which the digital world relies amidst changes in the international order. Existing frameworks ensuring the protection of subsea cables are weak. Reports from Chatham House highlight their unpreparedness to protect these in the face of conflict and fail to consider how to protect the mainly privately-owned subsea cables that traverse international waters.
Private ownership or control of undersea fibre-optic cables is not new. In fact, reports suggest that in 2018, around 50% of all fibre-optic cables were rented, owned or controlled in some way by companies (including such as Amazon). Other cables are owned by consortiums, telecommunications companies, or governments, often as part of collaborations with private entities. A growing recognition of the importance of fibre-optic cables is partly why internet companies are now opting to independently plan cable routes, over the traditional choice to lay cables as part of a collaborative effort between numerous companies.
Current discussions of subsea cables are incomplete without considerations of AI. It’s why companies such as Google and Meta have increasingly taken it upon themselves to develop vast networks of subsea cables. According to some reports, a growing interest in AI could mean over $4 billion will be invested per year in fibre-optic cables, with the lion’s share of investment conducted by private firms, like Microsoft, to connect data centres, rather than people. Subsea cables connect data centres to each other and can be understood as the hidden backbone that permits AI growth to take place. The vice president of network investments at Meta even noted that without subsea cables to connect data centres, “what you have are really expensive warehouses.”
The involvement of multiple actors in the development of a larger network of fibre-optic cables can still offer public benefits. It improves information flow and provides the possibility for a greater frequency of financial transactions. Physically unique cable pathways also increase ways to reroute internet traffic in case of damage to subsea cables. Fortunately, most damage that occurs to subsea cables is of little concern at present. Much of it is a result of natural disasters like tsunamis and earthquakes, or human activity that inadvertently damages cables, like fishing, rather than deliberate sabotage. According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the UN agency for digital technology, damage is frequent, with an average of “almost four cable failures per week.” Fortunately, protocols for repairs using dedicated vehicles are well-established.
Recently, fears that these little-known, but highly necessary pieces of tech could be subject to deliberate foreign interference or sabotage have grown. Reports have suggested actors could cause significant damage if they were to tamper with subsea cables as part of sustained sabotage initiatives. This is since cables process financial transactions that together, are worth trillions of dollars, each day, while facilitating digital communication. In 2024, 3 cables in the Red Sea were cut amidst sustained Houthi attacks in the waterway. The Houthis were blamed for the damage, which they denied. The cuts affected “25% of the traffic flowing through the Red Sea” and meant online traffic was rerouted to keep parts of Asia, Africa and the Middle East connected. In May, Australia’s deputy PM and defence minister, Richard Marles, placed the responsibility for damage to subsea cables earlier this year with Russia and China.
However, Doug Madory, a specialist in Internet routing infrastructure, has dismissed many concerns of targeted fibre-optic cable damage as being “hyperbolic.” Australia’s defence minister also noted the possibility of any damage indeed being accidental, as with most subsea cable damage. In 2025 Taiwan accused Beijing of deliberately damaging undersea cables, while Beijing dismissed the event as accidental, and the accusation as politically manipulated.
As of the present, systematic sabotage appears unlikely, although establishing blame for cable damage and clear intent to sabotage cables is difficult. Sea activity alone disproportionately contributes to subsea cable damage, which requires addressing. Without established frameworks, shared technology and protocols on how best to protect a common resource, the future of the physical infrastructure upon which the digital world relies, is vulnerable.
Fortunately, there is precedent for the governance of subsea cables. To address the general vulnerability introduced by the exposed nature of fibre-optic cables, accidental or otherwise, Australia, the UK and the USA also announced their cooperation on the development of marine drone technology designed to protect underwater cables. In addition, one could look towards Singapore’s handling of fibre-optic cables. They are recognised as an international hub for subsea cable traffic and have sought to maintain this status for economic purposes and the sake of national security. The state was among the first to endorse the New York Principles (2024), which outlined ways for states to protect fibre-optic cables. Singapore has also helped unify guidelines surrounding subsea cable repair for ASEAN states. The state even shortened the time repairs will take across the bloc, by reducing processing time, streamlining reporting and creating legal frameworks to prevent cable damage.
However, reports suggest geographical constraints surrounding Singapore and a failure of the state to continue to adopt regional leadership in the expansion, protection and handling of fibre-optic cable infrastructure could limit the effective governance of undersea cables. If fibre-optic cable development is expected to grow, this would presumably be accompanied by a growth in the frequency of accidental damage to cables. If actors cannot provide ways to safeguard cables from damage beyond the current method of routinely deploying repair vessels, this could hinder the growth of the field.
The question of where that leaves us today remains. Examining the world of fibre-optic cables serves as a useful reminder that as much as global politics has changed and adapted over decades, old ideas about how our world works remain relevant. Space has often been touted as the next global frontier. However, maritime developments still exert considerable influence over something as simple as subsea cables. Together, the influence these regions have on markets – and perhaps increasingly in the future, the way the foundations of the digital world are laid – demonstrates that Thayer Mahan’s famous 19th century maxim, “Who commands the sea, commands the world” still appears to hold true.
Indeed, political developments in the Strait of Malacca, the South China Sea, the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab al Mandeb and Red Sea are forcing routes to avoid these political chokepoints. Simply put, the nature of fibre-optic cable networks is changing. Newer cables are now bypassing South-East Asia to avoid contested waters; the South China Sea, and address the risk of accidental damage that placing cables across the narrow, busy, Strait of Malacca can bring, despite it already being an established centre for subsea fibre-optic cable traffic.
For now, the future of fibre-optic cables appears stable. However, continued uncertainty could mean the Red Sea is no longer viewed as a vital pathway for subsea cables to traverse and could encourage the development of alternative routes. This may even introduce vulnerability to states like Egypt, which has long benefitted from control over passage and charges for cable installation in the Red Sea, since many underwater cables eventually traverse through its territory.
The current international order, which is increasingly marked by a blatant disregard for once-revered ideals of multilateralism and global governance, is worrying. The increasingly self-interested and conflict-ridden world which we find ourselves in, has already led to the emergence of fragmented cable networks. A continued growth in interstate conflict (which is already at its highest level since the mid 20th century), could mean physical cable routes aren’t just shaped by conflicts, economically benefitting some actors over others. They may even eventually be accidental, or intended, casualties in future conflicts, to the detriment of millions.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and may not reflect the opinions of The St Andrews Economist.
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