By: Embla Reykdal
In an increasingly globalised world, geographical distance from conflict is of little comfort, most recently seen in the havoc the attacks on Iran have wreaked on the world since it began on 28 February 2026. While the media is witness to countless strategic and diplomatic attempts by leaders in America, Asia, and Europe to ease tensions, the impacts of the war on African countries’ economies and security has received much less attention.
Many African countries have long relied on oil imports from Iran. Having strengthened many of their individual trading partnerships with Iran since 2023, exports from Iran to Africa were in 2025 reported to have reached up to 675 million US dollars. However, with Iranian exports being cut due to the war, many African countries are currently, like many other parts of the world, experiencing a fuel crisis. Countries like South Sudan, which generates 96% of its electricity from oil, and Mauritius are now rationing and restricting electricity consumption, while Ethiopia and Zimbabwe are looking for alternative sources of fuel. In Zimbabwe, where petrol prices had increased to 2.23 US dollars per litre and diesel prices to 2.11 US dollars per litre by April 2, the authorities have, among other measures, reduced taxes on diesel and plan to increase the amount of ethanol in petrol from 5% to 20% to reduce fuel costs. As petrol stations across the continent are quickly running out of fuel supply, and with a fuel crisis bleeding into the transportation and agricultural sectors, fuelling cost-of-living crises, governments are trying to reassure increasingly insecure citizens. Kenya has warned people against panic buying, while Uganda has cautioned fuel distributors against increasing fuel prices. Some countries may, however, profit off the fuel crisis. Countries such as Nigeria and Angola, two of Africa’s largest oil producers, may now be in a position to experience an increase in export revenues or benefit from new business as a result of the conflict.
Beyond the oil crisis that has hit most of the world’s nations, the African continent is also
particularly vulnerable to disruptions in fertiliser importation. Many African nations rely on fertiliser exports – including sulphur, urea, and phosphate – from the Gulf, 20-30% of which is transported through the Strait of Hormuz. 54% of Sudan’s fertilisers, 30% of Somalia’s fertilisers and 26% of Kenya’s fertilisers are imported from the Middle East. North African
countries like Egypt, Algeria and Morocco, which are regional fertiliser suppliers, rely on
urea and sulphur imported from the Middle East to convert phosphate to fertilisers for the rest of the region. However, with the instability surrounding the Strait of Hormuz since the
outbreak of the war, fertilisers have not been able to reach their destinations. In March, it was estimated that around 3-4 million tonnes of fertilisers had been stalled per month since the war began. By April 30, 44 ships transporting fertilisers had been struck in the Gulf. The shock to fertiliser exports has been predicted to increase fertiliser prices up to 15-20% over pre-war levels. With a fertiliser shortage, we are likely to see a “de facto global auction” for fertilisers, in which many poorer African nations cannot afford to compete. As
food production in most African states depends on these fertilisers, there are therefore increased concerns about an imminent major food shortage and food insecurity in some of the world’s most vulnerable communities.
The food shortages and economic crises brought about by the Iran war, have wider societal impacts. Motaze argues that underlying conditions such as “a high degree of reliance on foreign markets, volatility of commodity exports, substantial debt levels, and the inadequacy of national infrastructure” contribute to deepening the economic consequences of the war. Food and oil shortages are also likely to exacerbate existing instabilities. Inflation and food insecurity as a result of the economic crisis are, according to Mayamba, must be considered as human rights problems as governments are likely to “cut spending on health, education, and social protection, the very services that protect human dignity”. The food and subsequent health crises are worsening as humanitarian aid, especially in southern and eastern Africa, is unable to reach its destinations as the fuel crisis makes transport of humanitarian resources too expensive. Furthermore, armed groups may exploit the situation and further disrupt trade routes and humanitarian aid deliveries, increasing insecurity in conflict zones like those in Somalia and Sudan.
Due to our current levels of globalisation, crises in Africa, like the war in Iran, are not isolated to the suffering countries or even the African continent but will have global
consequences. Fakir at the Middle East Institute (MEI) in Washington, considers that China and Russia may establish greater influence in the region by presenting new food supply agreements, aid, and investments in agricultural infrastructure, which would significantly
restructure global commercial relations far beyond the current crisis. Instability intensified by food insecurity may also allow Russia to gain an even greater hold in African nations such as Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, where US and French counter-terrorism partnerships have been displaced. Additionally, security cooperation with the EU has broken down as civil governance collapsed due to military coups, further altering transnational relations and international cooperation with these states. Additionally, food insecurity is a major contributor to migration, as was seen by the global food crisis triggered when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. We may therefore see a spike in migration from Africa, especially among the young, displaced or unemployed from countries in the Sahel region.
Thus, the US and Israel’s war on Iran has far-reaching consequences in Africa that will likely
cause a greater humanitarian crisis in Africa and have major spill-over effects globally.
While the average citizen experiences a cost-of-living crisis and food insecurity, exporting countries such as Nigeria and Angola may grow richer. However, as “proxy militancy and hallway diplomacy threaten to turn the continent into a secondary theater for foreign agendas”, African countries may establish greater strategic autonomy and step out of the role as “pawns in a wider geopolitical game” if African leaders forge a more self-reliant, unified continental stance. Thus, as Motaze argues, the conflict may be seen as presenting to African countries a “complex mosaic of crisis and opportunity,” which continued uncertainty in Iran is certain to bring about.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own, and may not reflect the opinions of The St Andrews Economist.
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