By Isabel Downer
The House of Lords in overcrowded, unelected and often aristocratic. However, it frequently improves legislation more effectively than the House of Commons. Therefore Kier Starmer’s plan to abolish it in order to “restore trust in politics” raises a serious question: does it risk breaking a system that, despite its flaws, largely works?
The Lords can propose amendments that quietly force the government to rethink flawed bills, from criminalising harassment based on gender to reducing single use plastics. These and other changes rarely make headlines but often improve the final law.
Is it truly democratic, then, to have an unelected chamber serving as the UK’s most effective legislative check?
What the Lords Is and What It Is Not
The Lords is where 650 Member of Parliament (MPs) debate and vote on new laws. Peers appointed by the prime minister, inherit titles from a parent (most of which were abolished in 1999) or hold certain positions, such as the Archbishop of Canterbury. The result is a group largely independent of party politics.
Its powers are also limited. Under The Parliament Acts, the chamber can delay legislation for up to one year but cannot block it. The Salisbury convention prevents the Lords from obstructing flagship manifesto bills. In short, it is a revising chamber, not a rival one. However, this design often slows the government rather than simply helping it to govern.
Why It Works Better Than The Commons
The Lords draws on expertise from a wide range of careers, including lawyers, doctors and public servants. This mix of expertise offers perspectives that MPs, who are tied to constituencies, often cannot. Members are largely free from electoral pressure, which enables them to challenge populist policy.
The 2018 Audit of UK Democracy notes that the Lords has “played a significant role in amending legislation”, showing how it can act as an effective check on government actions. Non-party peers and even those with party affiliations are not bound to vote along party lines, which provides a broader and less political perspective compared to that of the Commons.
The Case Against
The Lords is entirely unelected; critics argue that the Lords is inherently undemocratic as a result. As the Electoral Reform Society (ERS) states, “In a democracy power should rest with the people- not those appointed or born into their seat.” Such a system, where seats of the upper house are based on nominations and birthright, is entirely unique to the UK. No other parliament in Europe selects such prestigious seats with no public say.
The Lords is unrepresentative of the British public. Analysis by the Electoral Reform Society shows persistent regional imbalances. The East and Southeast of are overrepresented with their share of seats in the Chamber numbering around 20% higher than their share of the population. In fact, London alone has about twice as many representatives as its population would suggest. In light of such imbalances, the ERS call the Lords “a publicly funded private members club” that is “outdated and warped.”
The Lords is also overcrowded. As of September 2025, the chamber consists of 827 members, making it the world’s largest secondary chamber and also the only upper house that is larger than its lower house. This oversized membership reflects neglect, not inclusiveness: for example at least 51% of peers were privately educated compared with only 6.5% of pupils in England.
Lastly, the Lords is weakly regulated. The Appointment Commission has limited power which leaves the prime minister free to favour close allies over individuals with relevant expertise. There are also gaps in oversight, which have been exposed by recent scandals, such as when Lord Evan of Watford was suspended in 2025 for offering influence in exchange for payment.
Why Reform Has Been So Hard
The failure to reform the House of Lords is not for a want of effort. In fact, since 1999 there have been repeated attempts to reduce or abolish the role of hereditary peer, all of which have failed. But why?
Large-scale reform is inherently controversial and there is no clear agreement across or even within parties. Proposals for a mainly or fully elected chamber require compromise, which is difficult when achieving such compromise requires politicians to vote to limit their own power and influence.
Beyond the obvious barriers to creating reform is that change risks unsettling the entire constitutional balance. An elected second chamber would undermine the constitutional principle that the Commons is the dominant chamber. With their own democratic mandate, the Lords may feel justified to block legislation more aggressively, thereby weaking the Commons’ authority.
This creates the opportunity for deadlock between the two chambers as both could claim that they represent the electorate. Such deadlock could end up preventing the government from enacting any meaningful change at all.
Incremental changes – such as the House of Lords Reform Act of 2014, which allows removal for non-attendance or serious offences – have had a limited impact. Small wins like this act even slow momentum, as they reduce the political drive for deeper, structural change.
The Best Bad Option?
Britain’s problem is not simply that the Lords lacks a democratic mandate, but that it lacks discipline and limits transparency. These defects can be corrected without turning the Lords into a rival Commons.
For starts, cap numbers: the Lords’ most obvious failure is its size. This is not a sign of representation but of a system that has been left on autopilot. A cap to the size of the Commons has been already found to be supported by 71% of the public. This limit would force the government to think through their nominations more thoroughly, as the appointment of a new peer would require an old one to retire.
Secondly, strengthen the appointment oversight process. The current appointment commission is largely advisory and often ignored by prime ministers. A reformed body should operate as an independent regulator with a clear and published criteria for expertise, public service and background, along with limits of the proportion of political peers relative to independents.
Thirdly, establish fixed, non-renewable terms. Lifelong peerages were once meant to ensure independence but now inflate the chamber. Fixed terms would preserve freedom from electoral pressure while also allowing for gradual renewal.
A Case for Modest Repair
Reforms do not need to be radical to be effective: by reducing numbers and improving oversight, they can strengthen the Lord’s roles a quiet check on government.
The House of Lords is flawed overcrowded, undemocratic and unrepresentative. However, it consistently improves legislation and brings expertise that the Commons cannot. Abolishing it risks destroying a system that largely works, for very little gain. Modest measures, a cap on membership, an independent appointments commination and fixed terms, could curb its most glaring flaws without undermining its strengths. Britian does not need a radical reinvention. Instead, it needs a chamber that is leaner, more disciplined and better regulated.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own, and may not reflect the opinions of The St Andrews Economist.
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