By Fabian Eryk Shelton
In 1983 United States President Ronald Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), an expansive Department of Defense (DoD) project promising security from Soviet nuclear missiles. It demonstrated President Reagan’s commitment to revive the United States’ dwindling arms reserve, engendered by prior U.S. presidents’ rapprochement with America’s allies. SDI represented a massive overhaul of America’s force posture, committing substantial resources to advance a hitherto moribund defense network. Due to underdeveloped technologies, SDI ultimately failed: however, despite its failings, SDI reflects an epoch within American force posture: recognizing the need to possess lethal space capabilities to ensure deterrence against the Soviet threat.
Many in the American security establishment have seemingly failed to recognize the importance of a robust space presence advance American grand strategy Because of its underdevelopment in space technologies, previous administrations have allowed China to catch up with its own technologies. The United States Space Force’s (USSF) Vice Chief of Space Operations Gen. Michael Guetlein testified that China has now been exercising “space dogfighting” in which Chinese satellites are attempting to sabotage or destroy American constellations. The United States must advance its space capabilities to ensure its strategic dominance and to deter Chinese excursions within critical regional theaters.
The DoD has already made some progress with shifting the discussion to the field of space with the publishing of the Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3100.10 “Space Policy.” The DoD clearly articulates that American security agendas will recognize space as a priority domain of national military power. Recognizing its significance within US-China competition, the DoD has successfully adopted a doctrine which endeavors to secure and preserve access of the space theater for American operations in advanced space interests and to deter aggression from aggressive actors. An expansive field such as space would demand increased coordination between DoD and other national security infrastructure– specially, the National Security Agency, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. This pursuit would increase harmony within the United States’ defense operations, developing robust lanes of defense policy from a diverse portfolio of security experts.
To ensure all needs are met in American space strategy, the United States should outsource R&D to its vast network of civilian space contractors. Despite China’s state supported defense contractors guaranteeing en masse production of space technologies, its civil-military fusion innovative talents are dwarfed by the United States military-industrial complex. Lockheed Martin, one of America’s defense base heavyweights, has been working on its space R&D programs. For example, the SmallSat Processing & Delivery Center, a highly efficient satellite factory with state-of-the-art replica technology, allows Lockheed Martin to develop 180 spacecraft a year. Such industrial capacities and the ability for America’s defense contractors to innovate and advance their technology at a staggering pace is crucial to supply the United States with the weapons and equipment to guarantee America’s lead against China’s rapid industrialization and deny easy opportunities for aggression.
Most notably, Lockheed Martin has developed a strategic infrastructure for the realm of space. The Command Control Battle Management Communications (C2BMC) is the culmination of USSPACECOM’s logistical experience and Lockheed Martin’s technological infrastructure to create a prodigious multi-layer missile defense system, allowing commanders to make synchronized decisions about threats at any range from across the world. With the deployment of C2BMC and its vast global communication network, Lockheed Martin and the USSPACECOM will have connected space security with other domain infrastructure, grounding space operations with connections and resources across the United States’ military apparatus.
Because of defense contractors’ expertise, it would be prudent for the DoD to develop greater relationships with private industries to outsource more ambitious contracts, free DoD resources, and capitalize on specialization. Additionally, having a greater pool of defense contractors competing with one another for contracts would develop an environment ideal for more advanced and innovative solutions to space defense. The DoD must seek out not only legacy defense contractors, like Lockheed Martin, Northrup Grumman, and Boeing, but also small defense contractors, incorporating them into the United States’ defense base to achieve a more competitive market. Such outsourcing need not be expansive weapons platforms popularized by large defense firms; rather, allocation of supporting technology – i.e. global positioning software for satellite constellations and enhanced terra communication systems to refine space-earth communications – towards smaller defense contractors will develop technologies that enhance the effectiveness of the United States’ space arsenal and network. Having USSPACECOM committed to public outreach towards small defense cooperations – such as demonstrations, workshops, and a streamlined contract award system – is imperative to make space contracts more lucrative for small defense cooperations and to capitalize on the United States premier advantage in private-military relations.
To ensure the preservation of its commercial and defensive space network, the United States must be committed to developing appropriate counterspace power. Having effective counterspace technologies allows a country to deny another’s access to its space network, reducing its offensive capabilities. Huang Zhicheng of the Beijing Systems Engineering College claims “誰控制了宇宙，誰就控制了地球” (whoever controls the universe controls our world; whoever controls space controls initiative in war). The PRC has echoed his beliefs, enhancing its counterspace technology network. China’s counterspace infrastructure includes a variety of telescopes, radars, and other sensors that allow China to support missions like intelligence collection, cyberwarfare, ballistic missile, and early warning systems.
Such advancements have increased the cost for the United States to engage in conflict with the PRC. For instance, the PLA could execute a cyberattack to establish preemptive information dominance in the early stages of a conflict to constrain the United States tactical flexibility or slow the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s mobilization and deployment. Despite American advancement in drone and missile-based technologies, such assets would be rendered useless if the United States fails to acquire counter space technology that would prevent the PRC from neutralizing them before they were ever launched; therefore, not only should the United States rely solely on offensive space capabilities, American policymakers must acknowledge the need of a greater defensive network within this theater, advocating for effective radar and early warning systems to quickly recognize preemptive threats and the missile technology or enhanced cyber systems programs to deny successful sabotage operations.
In Fiscal Year (FY) 2024, the DoD recognized the United States disparity in counterspace technologies compared to the PRC. Therefore, it began developing its space infrastructure, requesting $5.0 billion for missile warning/missile tracking (MW/MT) architectures, 481 million in ground and space-based sensors/deep space radar, and $131 million to produce highly active detectors of space objects. Although this was a promising start to a shift in space military funding, this funding should not on an ad hoc basis against the backdrop of China’s rising influence in space. $5.0 billion in space developments would be expended quickly on account of the complexities of R&D in such a unique geostrategic field. With FY 2026 approaching, space spending should be prioritized within the next DoD spending request to guarantee that the United States’ space technologies are cutting edge and adequate to counter Chinese attempts to usurp the United States’ dominance. The DoD should continue to request these appropriations beyond FY 24 to ensure contracts are fulfilled and critical infrastructure like the MW/MT would be developed and deployed within America’s arsenal.
In the same vein, the United States should advance its position in the space theatre by integrating artificial intelligence within its satellite constellations. Once the DoD has advanced its space arsenal, it will begin to experience diminishing marginal product due to a diminishing workforce. Some tasks demand the asset of a fast-thinking AI program to ensure rapid communications and effective data transfer amid US-China competition. Northrop Grumman has collaborated with NVIDIA to develop AI for space projects in the pursuit of a “cognitive spacecraft.” The technology will boast heightened awareness of its environment and a prodigious ability to automatically generate and execute mission commands. With this, AI will replace the human error of space defense, allowing defense networks such as MW/MT and early warning systems, to maneuver with limited human interaction, allowing for greater and more complex operational range, which is instrumental in the field of maintaining American deterrence strategy.
Though technological advancements are critical to solidify the United States’ position on the space frontier, there also must be a clear doctrine that acknowledges and regulates orbital conflicts. Save for an out-of-date 1967 Outer Space Treaty “preserving” space as a peaceful theater for research and exploration, there is very little legislation that outlines the rules of engagement within space. Such ambiguity invites gray zone competition – conflict which rests outside the threshold for war, allowing the PRC to sabotage, deny, or proliferate celestial technologies with impunity. Gray-zone competition in space would effectively obscure the United States’ overall mission readiness within all domains as space is a key support network for communication and command functions.
Therefore, Washington must be proactive in asserting red lines in space theater towards allies and adversaries. This should be done in a formalized setting involving the echelons of the United States’ national security apparatus– Secretary of State, Joint Chief of Staff, National Security Advisor Director of National Intelligence, etc. – to ensure a multi-layered, precise, and credible approach towards apprehending potential flash-points in space between the United States’ and the PRC. This would entail outlining the sensitive nature of government and private satellite constellations, denying Chinese space-dogfighting or any other form of aggressive maneuvers Beijing would employ to weaken the United States’ aggregate power, and treating space as any other frontier, such as the South China Sea – guaranteeing that any efforts perceived as malign in nature would be interpreted as a pretext for potential conflict. Doing so would reveal to the international community that Washington is serious in defending its vast space network and dedicated to preventing the emergence of flashpoints in another theater.
President Reagan’s SDI program was a promising start towards the United States’ shift towards a defined space strategy; however, the United States should not rely on outdated Cold War policies to ensure effective deterrence amidst rising adversaries and ever evolving technologies. Beijing’s advancements in space technologies are real and critical threats to the United States. Beijing has the potential to significant impair the United States’ military readiness in critical theaters such as the Indo-Pacific, effectively obliterating the United States’ prestige as a global security hegemon. However, by adopting a more coherent space policy focused on themes of robust civil-military relationships, AI integration, and sustained funding within critical space infrastructure, the United States would not only preserve its space hegemony, but revolutionize space strategy within America’s security network, allowing for greater and more advanced operations in all domains.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and may not reflect the opinions of The St Andrews Economist.
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