By Taraneh Sanat
Indonesia has become Southeast Asia’s largest economy, rapidly rising to prominence in the region due to its robust resources, young workforce, and strategic location on the continent. Relative political stability has largely contributed to the ability of the state to harness these assets. As the third largest democracy in the world, the archipelagic nation has positioned itself to become a leader in the Global South, forging strong relationships with other regional powers, like India and China to promote the interest of geopolitics in developing nations. As a result, the government has begun engaging in a more active role internationally, a deviation from its platform under former president Joko Widodo. Nothing has made this more clear than the presidential ascension of former military general Prabowo Subianto last year. Prabowo’s presidency was kick-started by a string of visits to foreign powers, which he believes “shows that Indonesia is well respected and its presence is needed in bilateral and multilateral meetings to discuss important issues”. Additionally, he has shown significant interest in incorporating Indonesia into more intergovernmental organizations. However, the country’s long-held non-alignment stance in foreign policy may throw a wrench in Prabowo’s plans for expanding geopolitical influence.
Background
Indonesia’s history of non-aligned foreign policy is uniquely tied to its emerging leadership position in the Global South. The country was a founding member of the non-aligned movement (NAM), which was established in 1961 as the developing world’s response to pressures from the US and USSR to align themselves with Cold War binaries. The NAM movement served as a way to distinguish emerging African and Asian states from their imperialist counterparts in the wake of colonization; yet, it also limited their ability to engage with multilateral military alliances like NATO, which continues to be a dominant global force with minimal engagement from Asian states. Indonesia was at the forefront of advocating for a neutral stance, preferring to center the political and economic interests of the developing world. For better or worse, its history with the non-aligned movement contributes to the “free and active” foreign policy initiatives that have dictated Indonesia’s role in the international system for several decades, allowing it to maintain relations with the West while courting its adversaries.
Where does Indonesia Stand Today
Prabowo has inherited the nation’s non-alignment policy at a fraught moment for the international system. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine, deteriorating US-China relations, and the reorganization of the United States’ foreign policy under the second Trump Administration has exacerbated unilateral tensions. Insofar as Indonesia’s non-alignment stance remains intact, this places the nation in a unique position. By maintaining healthy relations with a variety of global powers, it asserts its international position, while leaving Indonesia free to act out of national interest. Prabowo has certainly signaled his intention to wield this leverage, insisting on continuing Indonesia’s “good neighbor” policy by not siding with large foreign powers in international disputes. Indonesia’s bilateral relationships with both the UK and Russia serve as an example of this. Prabowo’s insistence that ideological differences be put aside in geopolitics has allowed his administration to negotiate a strategic economic partnership with the UK launching this year, while running naval drills with Russia in the Java Sea. These contrasting relationships point to a successful execution of non-aligned foreign policy; yet, there are skeptics which criticize Prabowo’s use of non-alignment to involve Indonesia in strategic alliances. This has become especially controversial as Indonesia moves to join the BRICS alliance, which seems to go explicitly against the principles of the non-aligned movement. This push by Prabowo indicates that Indonesia may continue to expand its role in other intergovernmental organizations, like the OECD and the ICJ. These developments lead to an important exploration of whether non-alignment has helped Prabowo’s ambitious expansion, or exposed the nation to more geopolitical risks.
Benefits of Non-Alignment:
The benefits of Indonesia’s current non-alignment policy can be found in its growing role in the economic and political development of the Global South. Unbound to the position’s of the U.S. and NATO, Indonesia has been able to foster mutually beneficial investments with China which could have been limited under another foreign policy initiative . Technology has become an important area of reciprocal growth. One example of this is the growth of Indonesia’s most successful e-commerce startup, GoTo, which benefited due to early investment from Chinese-owned company Alibaba. China has also benefited from this relationship, as it has been able to expand its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) into Indonesia, which expands its own soft power influence over Southeast Asia. Additionally, the economic growth provided to Indonesia from maintaining free and active foreign relations has allowed the state to increase its intake of international investors. As a free actor within the international system, Indonesia has been able to implement liberal foreign investment regulations, which has increased interest in the country’s telecommunications, oil and gas, and pharmaceutical materials sectors. Indonesia’s non-alignment has also contributed to its role as an advocate for the interests of the developing world. As one of the most populous democracies in the Global South, it serves as a role model to a sphere of influence forging its own path as western alliances become increasingly tumultuous. The G20, in which Indonesia is the only Southeast Asian member, has played a pivotal role in these developments. Due to non-alignment, Indonesia is able to position itself as a solution to tense economic dialogues between Russia, China, and their counterparts in the G7. If deftly navigated, non-alignment could keep Indonesia out of any larger global conflicts, while still allowing Prabowo and his government to play the role of international mediator.
Risks of Non-Alignment
However, while non-alignment currently allows Indonesia to maintain positive relations with its western allies, it is possible that Indonesia’s issue-based alignments could disrupt the careful balance the country has created for itself. Indonesia’s insistence on acting out of national interest instead of single-power alignments has previously proved beneficial in improving the country’s economic position and international role, but the government’s hesitancy to declare a side in ongoing crises has set Indonesia back in its quest for a larger international role. In UN Human Rights Council votes, Indonesia has continuously refrained from supporting liberal democracies in any condemnation of human rights abuses in Xinjiang or Russia’s position on the UNHRC. This has limited the nation’s ability to promote itself as a democratic player regionally and left some liberal democracies frustrated with Indonesia’s neutral stance. What’s more, Indonesia has been viewed as deferring to China on international disputes and cherry-picking its non-aligned stance. This criticism has become especially prominent since Indonesia joined BRICS this past January. As a larger presence in the Southeast, China’s role in promoting the development of the Indonesian economy and its potential to maintain peace in the Indo-Pacific cannot be underestimated. In this case, non-alignment may prove increasingly unproductive to Indonesia’s regional security. Notably, Prabowo has eluded taking a hard stance on Indonesia’s sovereignty in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the South China Sea. This ambiguity on China’s role in the Indo-Pacific could be harmful to Indonesia’s role as a developing democracy, making its western allies more hesitant to collaborate on future security ventures. Additionally, Indonesia has strengthened its economic ties with both China and Russia through joining BRICS. The role Indonesia intends to play in BRICS is significant, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has signaled it intends to use its BRICS membership to expand Indonesia’s ability to collaborate with other developing nations. Based on the principles which founded Indonesia’s foreign policy, joining the developing power of BRICS could throw the nation’s intentions into murky territory. While the Foreign Minister, Sugiono, has attempted to strike a balance by signaling the country’s continued interest in joining the OECD, the tenuous balance between the two may not imbue Indonesia with confidence of Western leaders, particularly the current Trump Administration.
Conclusion
Today, Indonesia’s non-aligned foreign policy is clearly at a crossroads. Does the country continue its efforts to forge its own path in a system divided by global binaries, or does it choose a more traditional route and attach itself to the fate of other powerful states? These questions can only be determined with time, as President Prabowo and his foreign ministry begin expanding their role in intergovernmental organizations and continue to forge diplomatic ties in the Global North and South.The impact of potential membership to the OECD could greatly influence the future, as it could be a key factor in determining a complete deviation from the country’s past efforts at neutrality. However, it can be confidently assessed that non-alignment in Indonesia will face serious reform under Prabowo as the country looks to assert its global leadership.
Photo from Getty
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own, and may not reflect the opinions of The St Andrews Economist.