By Oliver Bruce
Four months ago, the American rapper, Macklemore cancelled his show in Dubai in efforts to condemn the Emirates’ policy in Sudan. He has been one of few to bring light to the crisis and the reality that, in public spheres, the UAE’s role in the Sudanese war is not as heavily scrutinised as it should be. The Republic of the Sudan has been embroiled in a brutal civil war for over a year and a half, and while signs do point to slight progress, regarding new aid provided, one can expect that this conflict will persist for a while to come. Led by Mohamed Hamdan Daagalo, commonly referred to as Hemedti, the Rapid Support Force (RSF) has been waging war against the Sudanese Armed Force (SAF) led by Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman al Burhan. While many believed that this conflict would be a quick yet brutal affair, what transpired has been massively drawn out due to foreign intervention, most notably through the UAE who have heavily backed Hemedti’s forces and this has led to what is now labelled as the ‘world’s biggest humanitarian crisis’.
The UAE has been responsible for shipping considerable quantities of arms to the RSF. One example is in Amdjarass, Chad, where the Emiratis built a field hospital to provide humanitarian aid, particularly to those fleeing violence in Darfur. However, the reality of this is quite different as just over 250 refugees have been registered there leaving many to believe that this is a guise for the Emiratis to smuggle military aid into Sudan. In the process of doing so they have potentially broken a UN Security Council arms embargo that has stood since 2004. The UAE adamantly deny these claims and remain consistent that the field hospitals in Amdjarass, and in the eastern city of Abeche, “continue to be a critical lifeline for those in need of medical care”. However, evidence provided by researchers specialising in flight tracking have suggested that the volume of flights sent to Amdjarass has far exceeded the number needed to build a field hospital. A UN report in January further backs this up and describes the allegations that the UAE have provided military aid to the RSF as ‘credible’.
The UAE has furthered its involvement in the region through its trade of gold. Sudan is the continent’s third largest producer of the material and the UAE have looked to gain a considerable share in the RSF’s reserve along with, according to reports by the Morning Star trading gold with the SAF. This implies it is supplying both sides of the civil war and prolonging it further. This is part of a grander scheme which has seen Abu Dhabi receive $115 billion worth of illicit gold from Africa over the last ten years including 2596 tonnes of gold which was undeclared and treated as Emirati in origin.
Furthermore, reports indicate that there is a three-way relationship between the UAE, the RSF and Russia through the Wagner Group. It is suggested that Hemedti has acted as a guardian for Wagner gold mines which Russia has become more dependent on due to Western sanctions. These exploits have aided in making Hemedti one of the richest men in Sudan and contributed to funding sustained efforts by the RSF in the war.
However, reasons for the UAE involving themselves in Sudan go far beyond acquiring large quantities of gold. Sudan has high geographical value due to its border with the Red Sea; the ‘Horn of Africa’, which sees roughly 12 percent of world shipping. This has not only drawn the interest of the UAE,but Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Iran who have had a particularly prominent presence in the region, being Sudan’s main arms dealers in 2007.
Beyond trade reasons there is also a belief amongst the Emiratis that Sudan, and other countries in the region, offer them a chance to expand their sphere of influence. As previously mentioned, in their efforts in Sudan , the UAE have also meddled in Chadian affairs through its ‘field hospitals’. Abu Dhabi, according to Emirati state run media, WAM, have sent a shipment of military vehicles and security equipment to the country in an effort to aid their efforts in fighting terrorism in the ‘Horn of Africa’ and defending their border. Further examples can be found in the UAE’s establishment of an airbase in the Eritrean port of Assab along with further military bases in Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti. This has been part of an overarching strategic objective of the UAE’s to expand their influence in the region as well as to create a ‘mini maritime empire’ to gain influence over the Mediterranean, Arabian and Red seas.
There is also a competitive element as the UAE tries to establish more extensive control over the region than their rival in the region, Saudi Arabia. There is a commonly referred to ‘sibling rivalry’ between the two as both fall victim to the decline of petroleum and attempt to diversify their economies and secure strategic assets like ports and agricultural land. In the case of Sudan, Riyadh is judged to have taken a significantly different approach to the assertive one taken by Abu Dhabi. Their aim has been to become the neutral mediator in the region, an approach which has seen them arrange and oversee a peace pact between Ethiopia and Eritrea and sign a military and defence agreement with Djibouti in 2017. A considerable reason for their approach has been motivated by securing the Red Sea from Iran.
The conflict of interests, as well as issues in relations regarding Yemen, have contributed to a deteriorated relationship between the Saudi crown prince and the Emirati president whom observers and political insiders believed were no longer on speaking terms in May of 2024. Tensions could further rise should there be a decisive winner between the SAF and the RSF as this could shift the power relations in the Gulf.
Ultimately, the states in the Gulf have the ability to end this war. Retired UN senior humanitarian adviser, Nicholas Stockton, suggests that if Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states adopted ethical trade policies they could bring a halt to the war. Husam Mahjoub, co-founder of TV channel, Sudan Bukra, focuses his criticism on the UAE claiming that without their direct support, the RSF would be unable to ‘wage war to the same extent’. As aid from the UAE persists the numbers of those killed and displaced by this conflict only increases and while we have seen the emergence of humanitarian aid in key areas such as Darfur and Khartoum one can expect this war, which has led to ‘the world’s worst hunger crisis’, to continue to wreak havoc on the lives of everyday Sudanese people.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and may not reflect the opinions of The St Andrews Economist.
Image Courtesy of WAM, Emirates News Agency