By Mary Henderson

Following its peaceful revolution in 1990, Mongolia has carved out an identity as a burgeoning stronghold for democracy in a region dominated by its increasingly authoritarian neighbours, China and Russia. The collapse of six decades as a communist satellite state under the Soviet Union led to a transition to a parliamentary electoral democracy, granting the population of 3.5 million people an opportunity to stand their ground on an increasingly volatile world stage. Romantic images of nomads travelling hundreds of kilometres on horseback to their nearest ballot box and older generations clad in their finest traditional dress to exercise their right to vote have captured the imaginations of the democratic international community and garnered hope for a new era for Mongolia.
But has this ideal stood the test of time? Recent parliamentary elections, though nominally free, fair and keenly monitored by independent observers, have been plagued by accusations of cronyism, corruption and inefficiency. Meanwhile, Mongolia is poised at the centre of many issues that dominate today’s conversation, whether that be the challenges surrounding juggling multi-pillared foreign relations, the transition to green energy or the need for an effective climate response. Maintaining and strengthening Mongolia’s freedoms is more essential than ever before, and yet remains a battle not yet quite won.
Constitutional reforms and the election results
This year’s elections were the first following a series of significant constitutional amendments in 2023. Fifty seats were added to the parliament, the Ikh Khural, making it a 126-seat body, with members voted in via a new mixed electoral system. This involved two ballots, one selecting individual candidates via a proportional vote, and the other choosing a party through a party list that distributed seats according to an ordered list of candidates. The lists enforced a mandatory ‘zipper’ format, where male and female candidates alternated on each party’s list. These reforms claimed to address disproportionate representation in constituencies and create a more inclusive political environment by ‘strengthening the legislature, increasing transparency, and bringing parliamentarians closer to the people they serve’.
The political system in Mongolia has hitherto been dominated by two parties, the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) and the centre-right Democratic Party (DP), who have dominated since the first democratic elections in 1992. This time, largely in line with predictions from pundits and pollsters, the ruling MPP achieved their third consecutive victory since 2016 with a slim majority at 68 seats. The MPP also currently hold the presidency. This was closely followed by the DP with 42 seats and, significantly, the emerging HUN Party with 8 seats, all won through the party list. The National Coalition Party and the Civil Will-Green Party each won four seats, also through the party list.
On the face of it, with five political parties now represented at the highest level, it may seem that political pluralism has been finally achieved and that parliamentarians are indeed ‘closer to the people they serve’. The reforms enable smaller parties to have an increased chance of accessing Parliament, levelling the playing field and theoretically lessening the chances of any one party gaining a supermajority. The percentage of women in parliament has risen to 25.4%, there is now increased representation of ethnic minorities such as the Kazakh community, and there has been a fresh influx of new names from a promising generation of young legislators. There is also the likelihood of reduced patronage linkages with the party list, with a more generalised governmental support for much-needed regional development as opposed to budget assignments to localised pet-projects in parliamentarians’ own constituencies. The HUN Party has marketed itself as the ‘third way’ between the two leading parties that have become increasingly similar, both in terms of policy and with allegations of scandal and corruption. Typically favoured by young urban professionals and expat-Mongolians, there was hope that this party would provide a robust opposition with the interests of a new generation of Mongolians at heart.
Aftermath of the election
Concerns have nevertheless been raised about developments following the election. The now re-appointed prime minister and leader of the MPP, Oyun-Erdene, unexpectedly invited the leaders of the DP and the HUN Party to join what he termed a ‘Courage for Rapid Development’ government. For the MPP, this was a tactical move to form a coalition with all the advantages that come without formal governmental regulations in place, a system that would neutralise the threat from the opposition by bringing them into the fold and thus ensure the stability of his government. The leaders of the next largest two parties have been appointed governmental positions, with the DP’s leader L. Gantumur the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Development, while the HUN Party’s leader T. Dorjkhand is the new Deputy Prime Minister for Trade and Investment. There are also a few major seats now held by DP members of parliament, including Justice and Internal Affairs, and Mining Industry.
There are reasons why this decision could be seen as the most expedient in the circumstances. For the DP, several years spent in opposition severely weakened internal unity, with party morale undermined by factional leadership disputes that saw many of the key names in the party leave. Taking on a position in government offers the DP a chance to demonstrate to the public their ability to govern stably and effectively as a credible alternative, while giving younger emerging members a chance to gain valuable experience in policymaking. The motivations for the HUN Party are similar, with this being a vital chance to show the viability of their party as an equal to the more established political system. Uniting the three largest parties in terms of policy also serves to place Mongolia on a stronger footing on the world stage, citing similar systems in Germany and New Zealand. The instability that comes with a lack of continuous policy between successive governments has been argued to have undermined Mongolia’s position as an attractive environment for foreign investment, a key priority to ensure its economic growth. A national consensus will now ideally mean that large-scale infrastructural projects will be carried out until completion, and long-term foreign policy can be decided upon.
For some, these political machinations have signalled a more worrying state of affairs. Cooperating with the ruling party in this way could be seen as an erosion of the checks and balances that a healthy opposition ought to provide. This would disadvantage the DP in particular, as a further loss of a distinctive identity results in increasing confusion over party policy and the potential rise of personality-based politics. Granting parties the power to decide who is featured on the party list and thus is elected has also faced criticism. Rather than run as directly elected candidates, both Gantumur and Dorjkhand were named at the top of the party list for their respective parties, prompting jeers on social media that neither were confident in their popularity enough to risk election through the individual candidate ballot. Concerns over a lack of an even playing field also extend to campaign financing, with reports that, despite some regulations over advertising, there has been an exponential growth in spending particularly by the MPP, which puts smaller independent parties at a disadvantage, particularly with a shortened campaign period of only 17 days.
Youth and activism as a force for change
The youth in Mongolia have long played an important role in political activism. Mongolia’s population is the youngest out of the East Asian countries, with approximately half the population under the age of thirty. According to a public opinion poll in 2022, only 36% of young Mongolians believed that political parties are sufficiently addressing the country’s needs, and this dissatisfaction has manifested itself in both political protest and democratic apathy. Mongolia fell in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index under Oyun-Erdene’s premiership as well as press freedom rankings, leading to fears of a decline in democratic freedoms.
In April 2022, young Mongolians gathered in large numbers in the central Sukhbaatar Square in Ulaanbaatar to protest against police brutality and demand social and economic reforms. Many of these concerns stemmed from a wider dissatisfaction with the country’s development and the economic opportunities, or the lack thereof, and the perception of politicians being primarily motivated by self-interest. This can be seen in the corruption scandal that unfurled in December of that year. Protesters held the second-largest peaceful protest in Mongolia since 1991 against the ‘coal mafia’ in Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene’s government that had stolen $12.9 billion worth of coal. These demands successfully brought about anti-corruption reforms for the complicit state-owned mining firm and demonstrated a real will for political change from the people. While a large proportion of parliamentarians entered the Ikh Khural for the first time this year from a wide range of previous professional experience, many of the old guard, however, were successfully re-elected through the party list. The MPP and DP parties particularly sought to present themselves as renewed by fresh faces, but the reality of this remains limited.
Mongolia’s place on the world stage
Mongolia has a tricky geopolitical position to balance on the international arena. Declining voter turnout has been a concern, with fears that apathy amongst young people when it comes to voting could translate into candidates being voted in by an aging generation who favour more traditional, pre-Cold War style of politics that closen relations with Russia. Furthermore, intertwined economic dependence on both Russia and China should not be underestimated; Mongolia has traded $85 billion with China and $17 billion with Russia, while only $2.6 billion with the US. Almost 90% of Mongolia’s export revenue comes from minerals, most of which are bought or processed by China, with heavy investment in mining programmes. China has agreed to loan $1 billion to Mongolia to advance its infrastructure, including financing a new hydropower plant in Erdenburen. Mongolia is also heavily reliant on Russia for natural gas, and that has arguably fed into its neutral stance during UN votes on the war in Ukraine. There are currently plans for a pipeline to be built between Russia and China, with a third of its going through Mongolia, that undermines Europe’s disentanglement from Russia’s energy markets. This would provide economic growth, but at the cost of further integrating a relationship with these authoritarian regimes.
While full independence beyond its immediate neighbours might not be possible, a foreign policy that seeks closer ties to ‘third neighbours’, democratically leaning countries with market economies such as the UK and Japan, has enabled Mongolia to strengthen its independent sovereignty. Mongolia has the capability to be in a very strong position with the rise in global demand for renewable energy sources, especially as an alternative to China. There is potential to capitalise off the desire to develop clean energy sectors, with Mongolia’s abundance in copper and rare earths a real chance to centre itself at the heart of the conversation. The Oyu Tolgoi copper and gold deposit has been a primary site for mining investment, for instance. This adjustment must be carried out carefully however, as a recent law establishing a sovereign wealth fund that takes a 34% of shares from future strategic mineral assets was highly condemned for putting off the very same foreign investors that Mongolia so keenly needs before it can fully stand independently.
Mongolia therefore has great potential to strengthen its position on the world stage. Now no longer distracted by campaigning and elections, politicians must focus on building both the domestic infrastructure needed to reduce reliance on third parties, and regain the trust and confidence of its own people. Despite issues over campaign financing, the elections on the whole were on the right track, allowing foreign observers to election watch and enabling the younger generation to voice their concerns. The proportional system enabled at least some parliamentary presence to the opposition. With a nominally united government, the primary task now is to ensure stability in governance, while remaining accountable and transparent. Mongolia is at a critical point in its development, and leadership that appreciates the importance of reducing dependencies and strengthening internal industry will be needed if the country is to carve out a place for itself internationally. Maintaining the momentum for democratic reform, prioritising the transition to green energy sources and investing in domestic development are all more important than ever before for ensuring the interests of the Mongolian people are met.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own, and may not reflect the opinions of The St Andrews Economist.
Image Source: Hector Retamal/ AFP via Getty Images

