By Tom Fort
In April 2023, Finland became the thirty-first member of NATO, doubling the alliance’s border with the Russian Federation and overturning a long-standing policy of military neutrality in Finland’s international outlook. Sweden followed suit in March of the following year, ending Stockholm’s own over two-hundred-year-old history of military non-alignment. NATO’s northern flank now looks stronger than it has ever been, with only the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad breaking the pattern of NATO shorelines now almost totally encompassing the Baltic Sea, which some analysts have now dubbed a ‘NATO lake.’ There are, however, islands within this lake, islands which have and may continue to play pivotal roles in the security landscape of northern Europe.
Åland is an autonomous region of Finland which lies to the west of the Finnish mainland. The archipelago consists of nearly 7,000 islands, is home to an estimated 30,000 people, and is a majority Swedish-speaking region. Åland’s location is one of both geopolitical and economic significance. Its position at the mouths of both the Bay of Bothnia to the north and the Gulf of Finland to the east means that whoever controls the autonomous region is afforded a unique vantage point from which shipping, passive or hostile, can be more closely monitored. In the case of hostile traffic, many in Finland are now arguing for Åland’s potential to be tapped into more extensively. The archipelago’s history and local opinion, however, are complicating the region’s ability to change.
Åland has a long history of demilitarisation, which began at the Åland convention of 1856 whereby the Russian Empire agreed not to militarise the archipelago following Saint Petersburg’s defeat in the Crimean War. As part of the region’s constitution, Åland cannot be fortified, and furthermore no military forces can be placed there. In addition to the region’s demilitarisation, Åland has also been neutralised since 1921, meaning that the islands must be kept out of conflicts and may not be used for any military operations, either directly or indirectly. The geopolitical situation in northern Europe has, however, rapidly evolved in recent years with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and many have begun to point out the vulnerability of this demilitarised zone within a military alliance, with some referring to the archipelago as NATO’s ‘Achilles heel.’
Specifically, many are concerned that Russia’s hybrid warfare against targets in Europe may find a new pathway through the Åland Islands to target infrastructure and undermine the stability of European societies. The Finnish economy is heavily dependent upon the straits surrounding the Åland Islands, with approximately 95% of the nation’s goods imported by sea, owing to a lack of feasible overland transportation options. Ships loitering close to the archipelago have become a key concern for Finnish patrol crews, vessels which some believe may be trying to target and cut undersea cables. Such attacks would closely resemble others that have recently taken place across the continent and for which the Russian state has been thought responsible, one of which being a large fire in May 2024 at a German arms factory responsible for supplying the war effort in Ukraine. Officials have also noted that in recent months there has been an increase in the jamming of satellite signals in the Baltic region, attacks which have often been traced back to Russian territory, either from Kaliningrad or close to Saint Petersburg. The Baltic Sea furthermore remains an active region for passenger ferry travel, so any sabotage attempts have the potential to undermine the stability of what are significant maritime economies.
While around 60% of the population on the Finnish mainland supports a remilitarisation of the Åland Islands according to a 2022 poll, such a change has the potential to undermine Helsinki’s global position. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index from 2023, Finland was the second least corrupt country in the world, behind only Denmark. Furthermore, Finland’s commitment to international law as an active member of various inter-governmental organisations could risk being undermined by the remilitarisation of the islands, which would involve the over-turning of the 1856 Åland convention signed with the former Russian Empire. A remilitarisation of the islands would also likely be regarded by Moscow as a hostile move, the consequences of which are more difficult to ascertain. Åland’s demilitarisation was set as a condition for Russian recognition of Finland’s borders, borders which were contested as recently as the Second World War. These frontiers now make up extensive tracts of NATO’s eastern flank, meaning that a traditional military assault on Finnish territory now carries with it a greater geopolitical risk. The strengthening of Russian military capacity both in the country’s western and northwestern territories following the ascension of Finland to the alliance in 2023, however, may offer an insight into how Russia could respond to yet another shift of the balance of power in northern Europe. Recent attacks on infrastructure, as previously outlined, such as those against the engines of NATO’s military capacity, offer a further glimpse into how a Russian reaction may manifest itself. Furthermore, recent polling suggests that most of Åland’s population does not support a remilitarisation of the islands, instead remaining committed to maintaining the region’s military neutrality.
In the evolving geopolitical landscape of northern Europe, Finland’s leaders face a dilemma. There is, however, precedence in the Baltic region for a change in Åland’s status. A remilitarisation of the islands could mirror a similar process which took place in Sweden following the Russian annexation of Crimea, aerial activities close to or within Swedish airspace by the Russian Air Force and a simulated attack on the country itself. As part of this change, Sweden moved to remilitarise its own Baltic territory, Gotland, which had not hosted permanent military personnel since 2005. In 2018, the Gotland Regiment was formally re-established, and Stockholm has slowly moved to reinforce the island’s defences through a variety of measures, including the installation of ground-to-air missiles. Military funding to the island rose significantly in 2022 following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, with the Swedish government setting aside up to 1.6 billion Swedish Krona (approximately $163 million) for the island’s military infrastructure. Through this process, Gotland became a symbol of both Swedish military rejuvenation and deterrence against Russian aggression, with commentators often referring to the island as being an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier.’ Unlike at the time of Gotland’s remilitarisation, however, both Sweden and Finland are now NATO member states, protected by the treaty’s Article 5 which requires all other member states to rally to Helsinki and Stockholm’s defence should the need arise. In this context, the need for greater individual deterrence may have lost the significance it carried a decade before, while pursuing it may carry a conversely greater risk in Europe’s volatile geopolitical climate. Now more than ever, a demilitarised Åland does not mean an undefended one, but as such a critical lifeline, the stakes are incredibly high.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own, and may not reflect the opinions of The St Andrews Economist.
Image Courtesy of Goran A., Unsplash