By Freddie Coughlin
Chad’s socialist opposition leader and critic of the military government Yaya Dillo, was killed in an assault by state security forces in his party headquarters In February of this year.
The shootout came just hours after the announcement of Chad’s long anticipated presidential elections to be held on May 6th. These elections are supposed to inaugurate democracy after thirty years of military rule, but critics argue that Dillo represented the only viable opposition to the current and ‘interim’ president, Mahamat Déby. On 2nd March, days after Dillo’s death, Déby announced that he would be running in May for election.
According to the government, the shootout occurred following an attack on the state security agency by Dillo’s PSF (Socialist Party without Borders) in retaliation to the arrest of PSF member Ahmed Torabi. Torabi had been arrested by the government for an attempted assassination on the president of the supreme court ten days earlier.
Defending their actions, the PSF asserted that their party representatives had been shot at whilst approaching the Security Agency building whilst searching for Torabi’s body, whom they believed to have been killed in custody. Just before Dillo’s death, he informed Agence France-Presse that the claimed assassination attempt by Torabi was falsified and that they had engaged in no such attack on the security building.
Following a UK pathologist’s review of Dillo’s death, Human Rights Watch and the UN Commissioner for Human Rights have both called for a full independent investigation into the circumstances of his death. During an interview with Reuters, Pathologist Professor Derrick Pounder suggested that the lethal shot was at very close range, or ‘a contact gunshot’ suggesting ‘extra-judicial execution’. The inference is foul play.
Dillo’s Background with Chad’s government
Dillo had persistently opposed Chad’s military-ruled government. He did so first under Idriss Déby who served for three decades. Despite his opposition, Dillo accepted a ministerial role in ‘Mines and Energy’ in Idriss Déby’s government in 2008. Following Idriss Déby’s death during conflict with rebels in Northern Chad in 2021, his son Mahamat Déby assumed power. Dillo and the PSF staunchly opposed the circumstances in which Déby acquired power and have demanded elections ever since. However, the story is complicated as not only are they from the same ethnic minority group, the Zaghawa, but it is also suggested that they are related, potentially cousins. Whilst their specific relation is unconfirmed, their family connection brings into stark focus the small size of the cadre wielding power over the country. It is a gatekept circle that undermines the notion of democracy in Chad.
So who will oppose Déby?
Following Dillo’s death, two more of the outspoken political opponents have been barred from standing by Chad’s Constitutional Council, namely, Nassour Ibrahim Neguy Koursami and Rakhis Ahmat Saleh. The Council cited “irregularities” in their applications as the reason for their application denial. Admittedly, ten other candidates have been cleared to run in the elections, including previous political opponent turned recently appointed Prime Minister, Succes Masra. The concern, however, is over the viability of these candidates.
In commentary on this concern, Dr Pippie Hugues, a democracy and governance policy analyst at the Nkafu Policy Institute, told The St Andrews Economist, “Now that Dillo is out of the way, Déby has silenced every voice of opposition within the country”.
Dr Hugues even suggested that Prime Minister Masra “validated his candidacy simply to show the world that there will be elections and therefore democracy” in what he condemned as “charade elections”.
The implications, internally and externally
The election will be perceived as undemocratic, internationally, and within Chad. It is likely that opposition figures and platforms will reject the result if it is carried out in dubious circumstances, or perceived to be undemocratic. Situated in a region as volatile as the Sahel, controversy or even dubious elections could spark civil unrest, or even a coup, perpetuating the instability. Oppositions groups are already expressing discontent, with one, Wakit Tama, branding the upcoming vote a ‘masquerade’, as well as calling for a total boycott.
The international response, however, has been varied. Human Rights Watch have flagged “serious concerns about the environment for elections scheduled for May 6th” whilst other human rights groups have highlighted the grave risks posed to oppositional candidates under Déby’s regime.
Major powers such as the US and France have not commented.
Geopolitically, Chad is vital for France, owing to its role in maintaining regional stability. Because of this, France and the US have supported Déby’s ruling within the context of a bilateral security partnership. Under French military support, Chad’s peacekeeping and counterterrorism operations across the Sahel have helped to suppress the presence of the Islamic State and Boko Haram.
However, anti-French sentiment is on the rise within the Sahel region. The military government in Niger ousted French military support after Macron condemned July2023’s military coup.
France’s incentive to maintain its grip on Chad is only bolstered by an increasing Russian influence in the region illustrated by their military and aid insertion to Burkina Faso earlier this year, and ongoing mercenary presence in Mali. Furthermore, Déby met with President Putin in Moscow in January 2024 to discuss their potential relations. The problem lies not simply with France losing its influence, but losing it specifically to Russia, whose associated Wagner group has already been accused of war crimes in the region.
A western condemnation of Déby’s actions could threaten a security partnership that is already drawn towards Russian influence in a region of diminishing of French and US control. Therefore, with Déby’s victory in May emerging as all but certain, it is clear why the west is weighing their response to Dillo’s death so prudently.
What can be expected next?
Governance and democracy analysts such as Dr Pippie Hugues highlight three expected stages of conflict surrounding the election. The first, and current period is ‘pre-election conflict’ which he suggests could pertain to “intentions to deter or bar oppositions and cause fright in voters”. This is likely to be followed by ‘election day conflict’. Hugues expects “militarised polling with intimidation and disruptions including the disappearance of ballot boxes and a lack of election materials”.
However, the potential for the most drastic impact is in the ‘post-election conflict’. Hugues highlights a “lack of independent election management body” as a key reason that oppositions are unlikely to accept the election result, which in Chad’s case is compounded with the existing set of controversial factors that indicate a fraudulent election.
Elsewhere in the Sahel, this has led to street protests and uprisings which have destroyed infrastructure and undermined human rights. One such being the protests following Niger’s 2021 elections.
The build-up to Chad’s long-awaited elections have followed a pattern of controversy and disrepute that has become only too familiar in African countries transitioning from military rule to democracy. It stands as a reminder that whilst elections are a crucial part of democracy and legitimate governance, their mere presence does not ensure it.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and may not reflect the opinions of the St Andrews Economist
Image Source: Ludovic Marin, AP