The international community generally views the 2016 Final Peace Agreement between the Colombian government and the insurgent group, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejèrcito del Pueblo (FARC-EP), as a progressive achievement towards implementing a gendered perspective in peacemaking. Eight years in, women’s participation at the negotiation table in Havana between 2012 and 2016 continues to impact the ways the country’s disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process is carried out today (Simanca Herrera). The United Nations extols Colombia as an example to the rest of the world in implementing gender-based peacemaking approaches, especially because the agreement adheres to UNSC Resolution 1325. Adopted in 2000, the resolution “calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements to adopt a gender perspective” through “the representation of women at all decision-making levels” and considering the “special needs of women and girls.” Hence, head of UN Women Phumile Mlambo-Ngcuka called women’s role throughout Colombia’s peace-making process “exemplary and historic.” Yet, her warning that “real success has to be measured through concrete results” speaks to the current reality, where the agreement faces criticism for its slow results and pitfalls especially in regard to its gendered-based approaches. Concerns today specifically target a lack of government adherence to the securitization of marginalized groups – especially that of ex-Farianas (former female FARC-EP combatants). This leads one to question to what extent can the gendered-perspective of the 2016 Final Peace Agreement be regarded as successful in 2024?
A Successful Step Forward
The 2016 Final Peace Agreement marked a major turning point in Colombia’s approach to how peace accords are conducted, especially in ensuring women’s presence during negotiations. In the thirty peace documents Colombia has signed since the 1980s, only 15 signatories have been women compared to 280 men. For the 2016 Final Agreement, two leading figures in the Havana negotiations, Victoria Sandino (ex-Fariana and current congresswoman) and Tanja Nijmejer (also known as the “Dutch guerrilla”), were present from the very beginning. Sandino, for one, knew the impact her role would have in creating “a window so women could have more visibility.” This window indeed widened in 2013, when Nigeria Rentería (Senior Advisor for Women) and María Paulina Riveros (at the time, Director of Human Rights of the Ministry of the Interior) joined as representatives of the Colombian government, thanks to the push of Colombian feminist groups. In addition to the small yet increased number of women physically present as negotiations went on, women took on informal roles that equally influenced the Final Peace Agreement. Bouvier claimed in her firsthand report on Colombia’s peace process, “at the table, around the table, behind the table, and at the sides of tables women are having their say and shaping the path to peace.” In fact, women’s inclusion – especially the establishment of the Subcommittee on Gender in 2014 – would not have been possible without the work of feminist organizations such as Sisma Mujer and the international community. Claudía Meja, Sisma’s Director, noted “the dialogues came at a time when the international community had raised the standard of gender inequality.” Indeed, a global trend towards taking a more gendered approach to peace-making processes was present before 2016. Earlier peace agreements contained gendered provisions based on Resolution 1325, including the 2011 Doha Document for Peace and 2013 Ceasefire Agreement between the Sudanese government and various insurgent groups. As such, outside actors and global trends pushed the Colombian government and the FARC-EP to include women in their own negotiations process.
Yet, while international pressure influenced gendered aspects of the Final Peace Agreement, the accord remains a progressive success in addressing a persisting lack in women’s representation during similar processes. Globally, women make up an average 10% of negotiators during peace negotiations. Additionally, only about 14% of 150 global peace agreements have included provisions for equality, and less than one-quarter of this small percentage formally acknowledges women’s equality. In this light, the 2016 Final Peace Agreement remains a step forward for the entire international community, adding its own ways of raising international standards. The document also shows the benefits in doing so, as it produces and formally acknowledges exhaustive gender-based policies otherwise left unconsidered on the international stage.
Including a diverse range of female voices at the negotiation table – such as NGOs, the Subcommittee on Gender, civilians, and ex-Farianas – resulted in a final document which formally acknowledged women’s differentiated suffering during wartime and their equal rights to benefits outlined in the accord (Final Agreement; Ruiz-Navarro). Furthermore, women’s concerns led to the formal acknowledgement of other marginalized groups. Special emphasis was placed within the final document on the fundamental rights and diverse peace-time needs of Colombia’s LGBTQ, indigenous, Afro-Colombian, rural, disabled, and elderly communities (Final Agreement; Ruiz-Navarro). These considerations were proven to be specifically pushed by ex-Farianas participating in the negotiations. Using their platform to advocate for the traditionally marginalized, ex-Farianas called for the land restitution and equal distribution of property for rural women, in regards to the “oppressions that women, Black and indigenous women, experience” (Simanca Herrera; Thomas). This sentiment falls in line with the FARC-EP’s history of recruiting those from rural, Afro-Colombian, and indigenous communities (Herrera and Porch). As a result, the Final Agreement mentions it was specifically “in the opinion of the FARC-EP,” that peace-time restoration “must contribute to resolving the historical causes of conflict, such as the unresolved issue of land ownership and, in particular…the underdevelopment of rural communities, which especially affects women, girls, and boys” (Final Agreement). As such, the 2016 Final Peace Agreement can be considered a physical manifestation of the benefits reaped from including women during peace negotiations.
Yet, while the Agreement formally acknowledged the rights and diverse needs of marginalized groups, success must also be measured by ensuing results. Since its establishment in 2017, the UN Verification Mission in Colombia monitors the Colombian government and FARC-EP’s compliance to the Final Agreement. Reportage from the UN Verification Mission in Colombia points to certain successful cases of implementation and adherence to the Final Agreement. For instance, the UN Secretary General António Guterres’ report on the 2023 Verification Mission finds that of the 726,673 hectares of land formalized by the National Land Agency, 67 percent benefitted Indigenous Peoples, 26 percent benefitted peasants, and 6 percent benefitted Afro-Colombians. Of these beneficiaries, one third were women. This means active steps are being taken to address the ex-Fariana’s request for equitable land restitution and distribution formally acknowledged in the Final Document. Guterres also noted the joint effort made between the Colombian government and UN country team to hold the first national meeting of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, and intersex ex-combatants. Doing so sparked conversation on public policies and strategies that better address the specific stigmas these groups continue to face. As such, the efforts and programs coming about the Final Agreement’s written gendered provisions allude to a degree of success.
Pitfalls and Short-Comings
Adherence to the Final Peace Agreement has not been consistent, however, as some measures are experiencing greater success than others. This has been made clear throughout the ongoing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process, where many continue to voice concern regarding the stigma and violence directed towards ex-combatants and other marginalized groups. This, in turn, questions the overall success and praise of the document.
Violence has persisted since the peace agreement’s signing due to a window of opportunity it presented for various actors to assert control over the criminal economies and territories left behind by the FARC-EP. Such actors include 30 newly emerging armed groups (alongside the familiar insurgent organization, Ejército de Liberación Nacional), right wing paramilitaries, as well as criminal gangs or “neo-paramilitaries” (The Guardian; New York Times; Insight Crime). This situation is a similar to concerns raised when the peace deal was originally rejected in October 2016, as Colombian voters worried the FARC-EP would use the vulnerability of demilitarized zones to regroup and rearm. Yet, while their worries proved partly true (an estimated 1,500 ex-combatants have refused to disarm), the FARC-EP’s diminishing presence catalyzed a much more complex arena of violence. Political violence – especially targeted towards ex-combatants and political leaders – emerged as a result of this “power vacuum”. According to the Investigation and Prosecution Unit of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, 415 signatories for peace have been murdered since February 2017. Additionally, Guterres’ report on the 2023 Verification Mission revealed a total of 406 killings of FARC-EP ex-combatants (including 11 women, 57 Afro-Colombians, and 49 indigenous peoples) occurred between the signing of the Peace Agreement and December of 2023. 81 of those murdered were former combatants who requested further security measures from the state-run National Protection Unit. Their deaths are evidence that the Colombian government has been too slow in fulfilling its security promises. This is clear in its minimal effort to hold killers accountable: the same report by Guterres highlighted only 71 convictions came out of 498 reported attacks against ex-combatants; only two of these convictions were cases regarding female ex-combatants. Thus, violence and impunity persists, despite a 2022 Constitutional Court ruling that said the government failed to ensure ex-combatants’ “right to life, personal integrity, and peace.” The evident lack of adherence to the Peace Agreement’s security guarantees is concerning, especially in regard to the particular vulnerability of ex-Farianas (who made up about 30% of the 7,000 FARC ex-combatants initially demobilized in 2016) and other marginalized groups emphasized in the final document.
Sandra Patricia Velasco expressed the shared frustrations and fears amongst her fellow ex-Farianas in an interview with The Guardian saying, “Our security is weakened because they have killed many ex-combatants… I feel very insecure.” Ex-Farianas not only feel insecure because of the violence directed towards their comrades, but also because of the additional stigma they face as women returning to a civilian life marked by traditional, patriarchal roles that run counter to the FARC-EP’s egalitarian lifestyle. They also face gendered community shaming, especially if they are single mothers, or turn to prostitution when jobs are difficult to find. Employment is a particular struggle for these women when “people don’t see us as humans.” Velasco continues, “they think we are terrorists who are still looking for war.” In this climate, ex-Farianas are particularly afraid to be politically active and reintegrate into Colombian society. This risks their genuine inclusion in the peace-building process that was originally sought for in the Final Peace Agreement.
Their fear for security is only heightened when the state continues to exhibit disappointing follow-through in its gendered provisions. As of 2022, only about 12% of gender provisions in the Final Agreement have been thoroughly implemented, compared to the 30% that exist within the document overall. Furthermore, while the state showed promise by increasing their government spending towards gendered provisions from 2020 to 2021, this share remained an underwhelming 4% of total peace expenditures. As such, many women impacted by the 52 year conflict – especially ex-Farianas – continue to be left neglected and disregarded by the Colombian government despite initial promises. Yet, beyond these disappointments and feelings of insecurity, ex-Farianas continue to demonstrate their commitment to peace. Some actively challenge the ongoing climate of stigmatization and fear mongering by leading reincorporation projects. In her ethnographic study on the agency and influence of ex-Farianas throughout the peace-making process, Laura Sabogal found women lead 18 of the 139 productive initiatives as part of the ongoing DDR effort. Thus, their showed willingness and efforts towards the peace-making process sheds a glimmer of hope, even if the Colombian government continues to show slow follow through.
Wavering Success
These concerns certainly paint a bleaker picture towards the supposed success and praise globally afforded to the 2016 Final Peace Agreement and its progressive gendered provisions. Critiques towards its shortcomings and failures are necessary to address what Dr Julia Zlver, expert on gender and conflict at the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies, calls “disillusionment around the actual implementation of what was written.” At the same time, however, peace agreements and processes are just as slow, tedious, and – even – conflict ridden as the wars they formally end. Anthropologist Carolyn Nordstrom famously argued this to be a “time-of-not-war-not-peace,” where complications, continued violence, and slow progress blur the distinctions between war and stability. As such, the 2016 Final Peace Agreement remains a learning process not only for the country, but for the international community also working out effective gendered-based approaches to peace-making processes. Thus, even with its shortcomings, the 2016 Final Peace Agreement should still be viewed as a progressive success. Nevertheless, it is a success in progress. More action needs to be taken by the Colombian government so that the document reaches its fullest potential, especially in its considerations towards the marginalized.