By Matthew Candau
On January 1st, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia announced the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland. This landmark agreement grants the landlocked nation 20 kilometers of Red Sea coastline for 50 years, allowing for the construction of a naval base and commercial port. The deal holds substantial economic and military promise for Ethiopia, a nation that has heavily depended on Djibouti for coastal access since Eritrea gained independence in 1993.
However, the status of Somaliland’s government as unrecognized and illegitimate has triggered prompt disapproval from Somali officials. A senior adviser to Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud expressed the nation’s discontent, stating, “We are pursuing all diplomatic options and I think Ethiopia will come to its senses, but we are ready for a war if Abiy wants a war.”
But how did the Horn of Africa arrive at such a precarious situation? And what could it mean for the security of the millions in the region?
A Brief History of the Horn of Africa
The modern history of the Horn of Africa is characterized by a multifaceted interplay of struggles for independence, interstate conflicts, and geopolitical dynamics. While Somalia, Somaliland, Djibouti, and Eritrea faced colonialism by European powers, Ethiopia stands apart in having successfully evaded formal colonization – a feat achieved through the Italo-Ethiopian Wars. Following 60 years of Italian control and an additional 12 years of British occupation, Eritrea found itself thrust into a federation with Ethiopia by the United Nations. This newfound nation granted Ethiopia access to the Red Sea coastline, leading to the establishment of a naval force at the port of Massawa.
Yet, this “harmonious” period was short-lived. Eritrean separatists engaged in a protracted 30-year war of independence from Ethiopia, ultimately achieving formal autonomy in 1993. However, the aftermath has been marked by persistent tensions, resulting in numerous armed conflicts over the past three decades, causing significant casualties and displacing millions. Despite recent positive strides in Ethiopia-Eritrea relations, such as formal collaboration during the Tigray War, the port of Djibouti remains the linchpin for 95% of Ethiopia’s imports and exports.
The era of colonialism saw Somalia partitioned into British Somaliland (now Somaliland) and Italian Somaliland (the rest of the Republic of Somalia). In 1960, these disparate territories unified to attain independence, becoming internationally recognized as a singular state. However, the period from 1969 to 1991 witnessed the collapse of the Siad Barre regime, characterized by internal dissent and civil strife. This tumultuous period birthed autonomous regions within Somalia, with Somaliland declaring independence in 1991. Despite establishing a functional democracy and military, Somaliland has struggled to secure international recognition.
Ethiopia’s Strategy
Ethiopia boasts one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, with an estimated 6.4% GDP growth between 2021 and 2022. Despite this impressive trajectory, Ethiopia grapples with one of the lowest trade to GDP ratios globally.
Several factors contribute to this lack of global economic integration. While Ethiopia utilizes Djibouti’s port for trade, the associated rental fees are notably high. Ethiopia bears the burden of paying over $1 billion USD annually to its neighbour, a staggering amount for a nation where 27% of its population lives on less than $2.15 a day. Moreover, Ethiopia’s primary exports, namely gold and agricultural goods like coffee, face significant competition from larger or more specialized economies. Despite gold being Ethiopia’s second largest export, 54 other nations outpace its export quantities. Consequently, the port of Djibouti primarily functions as an importation hub, facilitating Ethiopia’s receipt of essential commodities such as wheat from Eastern Europe and oil from the Middle East.
In a bid for more comprehensive integration into the global economy, Ethiopia has long sought sea access. A previous attempt materialized in a 2018 agreement with Somaliland, offering Ethiopia a 19% stake in the port of Berbera. However, this agreement fell through due to the inability to meet specified conditional terms.
The new MOU, although not legally binding, signals the potential for a pivotal juncture in Ethiopia’s pursuit of enhanced economic prospects and geopolitical influence. While the official text has not been released to the public, some sources suggest that the agreement pledges the eventual recognition of Somaliland as an independent nation, although skepticism exists.
The Situation in Somaliland
Despite having established a fully functional independent government committed to peaceful democratic transitions, Somaliland lacks formal recognition on a global scale. In recent years, western states have shown increasing willingness to establish informal rapprochement. The United States, for example, has been conducting a feasibility study for a potential relationship as part of its 2023 defense budget.
For Somaliland to integrate into formal trade and aid structures, acknowledgement of its independence is imperative; organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank only finance political entities that are internationally recognized. However, the prospect of global acknowledgment is limited, primarily due to Somalia’s strategic significance as a Western ally in the fight against international terrorism. The Somali government actively collaborates with the United States and Europe, engaging in counterterrorism efforts against prominent groups such as al-Shabaab.
The separatist stance of Somaliland from the Republic of Somalia has resulted in minimal cooperation between the two states. Both entities currently maintain among the lowest Human Development Index scores globally. With an arid climate and minimal arable land, Somaliland relies extensively on agricultural imports for its growth. Limited government spending capability, insufficient infrastructure development, and a primary sector-focused economy underscore the potential gains from increased foreign interaction and prospective independence recognition.
Hence, the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU signifies a substantial stride in a new direction for Somaliland’s sovereignty and growth. Reports even suggest that the deal may grant Somaliland a stake in Ethiopian airlines. However, it is essential to recognize that bypassing the Somali government to gain access to the territory it controls de jure comes with potential consequences that need careful consideration.
Peace or War?
Tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia have intensified since the announcement of the MOU. Somali officials quickly and vehemently denounced the agreement as an “act of aggression”. On January 18th, the Somali government even refused the ingress of an Ethiopian aircraft headed for Hargeisa into Somali airspace. The African Union stepped in to call for restraint and “meaningful dialogue”, but Somalia has refused mediation efforts until Ethiopia retracts the MOU and “reaffirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia”.
External dissent has also surfaced, with the U.S. special envoy in the Horn of Africa stating that Al-Shabaab is exploiting the MOU to increase its outreach. The Arab League has also labelled the MOU as a “clear violation of international law”.
Despite the high tensions, it is entirely possible, if not likely, that the MOU does not amount to anything. If formal recognition of Somaliland’s independence is a requisite, the security situation of civilians in the Horn of Africa could become even more dire. All involved parties must carefully consider the ramifications of their actions and discourse, as the tens of millions of impoverished citizens of the region are particularly vulnerable to armed conflict and economic shocks. Hence, diplomatic endeavours are crucial despite the delicate nature of the issue. As the situation develops and specifics unfold, the region must tread cautiously, balancing strategic interests and nationalism with the imperative for stability and peace.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and may not reflect the opinions of the St Andrews Economist
Image Source: https://www.dpworld.com/news/releases/dp-world-expands-offering-at-berbera/