By Nazneen Rahaman
Relations between India and Canada have been in turmoil for three months now after Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau stated there were “credible allegations” that Indian agents were behind the assassination of Canadian Sikh Separatist leader Hardeep Singh Nijjar – with India vehemently denying these accusations. This single comment from Trudeau has had significant fallout and has seen an unprecedented deterioration in Indo-Canadian relations, bringing this otherwise little-talked-about bilateral relationship to global media attention.
Controversies and international ruptures over Sikh separatist movements in India are nothing new. Indeed, Nijjar’s activism followed a precedent originating in the 1940s during the decline of British rule in India, when groups began advocating for the independence of Punjab from the rest of India and its repurposing as the independent state of ‘Khalistan’. Since the inception of this movement international relations have been roped into the dynamic through the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the latter stages of the Cold War in the 1990s, and in recent years Nijjar brought Canadian influence into the frame.
Nijjar was pivotal in this shift, fleeing to Canada in 1997 following his arrest during a ‘crackdown on insurgency in Punjab.’ He had been a key target of the Indian government in this issue, holding an unofficial referendum and gathering signatures for the new Sikh state despite the movement being outlawed in India as a supposed national security threat. Since fleeing the country, the Indian government grasped at control over the situation with Nijjar through various means. In 2014 an arrest warrant was issued to Interpol and in 2020 he was officially classified as a terrorist. Consequently, tensions with Canada compounded and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) had warned Nijjar of potential assassination attempts against him by the summer of 2022 – a year before his eventual assassination in June 2023. The fallout of this has left Indo-Canadian relations in disrepair and has resulted not just in increased tensions between those two nations or between the Indian government and supporters of the Khalistan Movement, but also in significant socio-economic repercussions too.
Indo-Canadian trade relations are not only long-standing – dating to the mid-nineteenth century and both countries’ status under the British Empire – but have also remained considerable into the twenty-first century. By 2023, Indo-Canadian bilateral trade had grown to $8.6bn, additionally six hundred Canadian companies operate in India with another thousand ‘pursuing’ the Indian market. In some ways the lead up to recent ruptures was characterised by diplomatic progression in the form of the India-Canada Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) negotiations, beginning in March 2022 and originally scheduled for completion by the end of 2023. So, evidently relations were able to withstand strains as they grew in the years preceding Nijjar’s assassination, but recent diplomatic relations have proved much more icy and the trade relations jeopardised.
Although it is clear that disputes remain at a ‘political-level’, all trade talks have been suspended and both governments have made diplomatic decisions that suggest significant fissures. Following Trudeau’s comments, both nations have recalled external intelligence officials believed to be at security risk, and India have issued a travel warning to any citizens traveling to Canada, due to concerns over “growing anti-India activities and politically condoned hate crimes.” This calls into question an uncertain future for a variety of migratory groups. Take for example the population of Indian international students at Canadian universities, which make-up forty percent of Canada’s total international student population. If this situation does not resolve itself then it’s likely that these numbers will drop over time, in turn affecting both the prospects of Indian students hoping to study abroad and the financial situation of Canadian universities – whose international students typically pay more than four times the fees of home students.
Other links have been put under pressure by turbulent diplomatic relations as all trade negotiations have been halted. At the New Delhi G20 Summit in September there was no one-to-one meeting between Canadian and Indian representatives and the suspension of talks has had an impact in exacerbating difficulties with India’s imports. Before the breakdown of trade talks, the Canadian government had stated that one of the primary goals of the talks was for Canada to ‘help India’s food security needs’. Now, since the breakdown of trade talks inflation on food prices remain high in India, at around 5%. But these rates are constantly fluctuating and the impact of a new Indo-Canadian trade deal would only likely have seen more long-term impacts.
Also important to note is that these diplomatic fissures have not permeated all forms of trade between the two countries. On the contrary, in terms of the development of infrastructure in India – another noted goal of the Canadian government – progress has been made despite diplomatic disputes. In September, the Indian government approved increased investments from Ontario-based commissions in highway development companies in India. So, although in some areas there is significant cause for concern over the breakdown of Indo-Canadian trade it is not necessarily yet universal or detrimental – still, a resolution of the issue does not seem to be coming in the short term.
The bigger potential threat would be if other countries were ensnared into the crisis. While this hasn’t occurred yet, there is historic support for Canada from their ‘Five Eyes’ allies: the US, Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, and Pakistan – a country with its own historic disputes with India. But these countries have thus far kept themselves entirely removed from the conflict, as for example Britain continues to move towards a new trade deal with India, unperturbed by the Canada question. On the other side of this, India has seen explicit support for its action against Canada, as Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Ali Sabry stated that Canada has become “a safe haven for terrorists”. Still, beyond this comment little has changed in terms of diplomatic relations and so at present the situation has not escalated beyond anything more than a bilateral political conflict.
Looking forward to potential resolution or escalation of this conflict, the future is uncertain. For both India and Canada there are considerable motives in domestic politics to uphold their current positions. For Canada, Trudeau’s position in a minority government in coalition with the New Democratic Party – led by Khalistanian independence supporter Jagmeet Singh – means he lacks great executive power to alter the Canadian government’s stance in order to resolve the dispute. Perhaps this could change following the next Canadian General Election, if either Trudeau wins a majority government or alternatively the Conservatives win a majority government, but that election isn’t due until October 2025. Similarly on the side of the Indian government there is little incentive to resolve the conflict so long as the supposed threat of tSikh Separatist Movement continues to be of greater consideration than continuing trade talks with Canada. This still seems unlikely as commentators note that the fight against Sikh separatism remains high on Modi’s political agenda and integral to maintaining his “cultivated strongman image”. Ultimately, as it stands, there is little incentive to resolve the conflict. Trade can continue between the two countries even while talks are halted, but the development of what could’ve been an immensely mutually-beneficial trade deal between two historically aligned powers has reached an icy standstill.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own, and may not reflect the opinions of The St Andrews Economist.
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