The Rise of the Individual Trader: Casual Investors Leave Both Regulators and Financial Institutions in Disarray

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 by Hugo Fischerstrom

In recent weeks, the trial of Sam Bankman Fried has put the cryptocurrency industry into the public eye. Once the prodigal son destined to bring crypto into mainstream finance, Mr Bankman Fried stands accused of conspiracy and fraud as he allegedly stole deposits from customers at his crypto exchange FTX in order to cover up losses at another firm called Alameda Research. Many economists, expecting a harsh regulatory crackdown, argue that the future of cryptocurrency has gone down with him, but only time will tell. The fascinating development of cryptocurrency over the past decade has been part of a greater trend in the financial markets: the rise of the individual trader. Lower barriers to entry through commission-free online trading platforms, readily available financial information, and the digitisation of markets means individuals need only some spare change and a computer screen to sit at the table and trade securities. This has wide reaching implications for the future of financial markets, the economy, and society as a whole. In order to better evaluate what Mr Bankman Fried’s plight means for the future of individualised trading, we need only look back at the Gamestop bubble of early 2021.

Towards the end of 2020, a variety of hedge funds (notably Citron Capital and Melvin Capital) decided to short the stock of Gamestop on the New York Stock Exchange after it reported heavy losses. On January 19th 2021, Gamestop announced that they were appointing three new directors which sparked interest in their stock on the r/wallstreetbets Reddit page leading to a stock price increase. The surge led to Citron Research tweeting that the casual traders are “suckers” who do not understand trading, and they offered to explain why their short position was a correct assessment.

This cocky response created a tug of war between casual investors on the Reddit page and hedge funds which, especially with public support from figures such as Elon Musk, resulted in the stock price rising dramatically, forcing the hedge funds to close their positions at a heavy loss. Melvin Capital was even forced to shut down in the wake of this chaos. In this bubble certain casual investors made fortunes. However, speculative trading like this is a zero sum game, and many casual investors lost large sums of money. 

The story of the Gamestop stock (GME) bubble brought the implications of casual trading into the public eye. The primary concern for regulators in this type of drama is for the amateur traders, who risk losing very large sums of money. Many casual GME traders found themselves completely exposed to the market with no wider portfolio or risk management. As Bill Gates put it, this type of speculative trading is a zero sum game akin to gambling, and the consequences for individuals who lose their savings on a roulette wheel like GME reach far beyond the market. American regulators are adamant about protecting casual investors and helping them understand this risk: in December 2020 Robinhood were fined $65 million by the Securities and Exchange Commission for “targeting young, inexperienced investors with flashy gimmicks on its app that treat stock investing like a game”.

Even if the individual is aware of the inherent risk, there is arguably an informational asymmetry between the hedge funds – who have skilled analysts, experience and, in many cases, privileged nonpublic information – and individual investors – who are forced to rely on public information and the analytical tools they can find. Thus, casual traders will often find themselves unwittingly at the bad end of the deal. This was most apparent at the height of the bubble, where amateur investors everywhere were buying stock at high prices without knowing the implications of their purchases. Arguably, it is the responsibility of the individual trader to understand their investments. Nonetheless, the losses incurred, as well as the predatory environment this fosters in the stock market, are very real and tangible problems.

Furthermore, one could argue that the larger, more established traders, such as hedge funds and investment banks, have a disproportionate amount of market influence and can themselves put pressure on the price of securities. This was exemplified in the GME short: the publicly known short positions of major hedge funds convinced other investors that the stock was overvalued, which put downward pressure on the price thus benefiting Citron and Melvin. Some would claim that influence to this degree constitutes market manipulation, making it impossible for less powerful individual traders to make their own trades. However, as we saw in the Gamestop Bubble on r/wallstreetbets, if casual traders band together to increase their influence, they can compete with the more established firms. The end result is a mess of manipulation, a mob mentality and an asset price completely disconnected from its underlying value – everything that market regulators want to avoid.

But not everyone sees this as an opportunity to get rich quick. Many traders involved in inflating the GME price did it merely as a way to ‘stick it to Wall Street’. This is a general sentiment in the western economies, where the Occupy Wall Street movement of the early 2010s has devolved into a general disdain for large financial institutions under the impression that they make money at the expense of the working class. In the case of the Gamestop bubble, the fact that the big hedge funds were in effect betting against a company and deriving value from its downfall did not help their image. 

Many see the individual trader as a hero, someone faring into foreign lands to bust the monopoly big firms have over financial markets and make them pay for their perceived exploitation of the working classes. On the other side of the political spectrum, the romanticised individual trader is the poster child of individualistic capitalism – a lone wolf who makes money on the unregulated market by being better than everyone else. None of these images are entirely accurate, nor are they relevant to the economic theory and consequences of individualised trading. However, they show that these rogue traders have widespread support in society and politics, even when orchestrating a short squeeze and engaging in blatant market manipulation. This poses a challenge to regulators, who want to stop irresponsible trading practices, but cannot appear to be unnecessarily hard on individuals after the bailout policy adopted towards Wall Street.

This bubble became more controversial on the 28th of January as retail trading platforms including Robinhood and TD Ameritrade restricted almost all purchases of the GME stock. This was met with huge backlash from the casual trading community and led to a number of class action suits against Robinhood and other platforms. TD Ameritrade made a statement saying this measure was “in the interest of mitigating risk” as spending large sums of money on greatly overvalued stocks can lead to problems both for traders themselves  and the market as a whole. Robinhood explained in a company blogpost that “it was not because we wanted to stop people from buying these stocks … we had to take steps to limit buying in those volatile securities to ensure we could comfortably meet our [regulatory] requirements.” Whether this move was justified is under debate, but trading platforms have a responsibility to make sure they are not financially exposed and they have partial responsibility to protect their customers. However, this was interpreted by many as a move in defence of the status quo on Wall Street, robbing the individual traders of their power. 

This begs the ultimate question of how these platforms should be run and regulated. Should individual traders be allowed to lose all of their money on the market if they do not understand it, or should there be some protection and insurance in place? Regulating to protect some traders also involves limiting the potential upside for other traders, and excessive regulation of the stock market arguably removes the competitive element which makes it so valuable. The question is how regulators can encourage enough speculative trading on the markets to keep firms at the frontier of efficiency, whilst protecting vulnerable investors from scams and dangerous trades. 

The class action suit against Robinhood was dismissed on the grounds that the firm  had the right to restrict trading as part of their customer agreement, but this discussion is far from over. What responsibility do individual traders have in understanding the market and trading responsibly? Should individuals be held to the same standards as corporations when it comes to insider trading and market manipulation? How can these responsibilities be enforced through regulation on individuals and platforms? All these questions are at the forefront of economic debate, and it will take many years for regulators to find a solution. However, the hefty charges levelled against Sam Bankman Fried – who looks at spending the rest of his life in prison – shows that purposefully defrauding the casual trader will not be taken lightly.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own, and may not reflect the opinions of The St Andrews Economist.