by Charles Deregnaucourt
The Middle East is never short of surprises. On March 10th, Beijing brokered an arrangement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, marking an unexpected resumption of the diplomatic ties that they had severed in 2016. Seeing as both states have been perpetuating violent proxy war throughout the region for years, the news was particularly shocking.
Could this unexpected turn mark an end to the pseudo–Cold War that has plagued Middle Eastern security for decades? Regrettably, probably not. It does, however, highlight the start of a new chapter in the region’s geopolitics. To put it simply, both states are exhausted. The Chinese-brokered deal being purely transactional, the two foes, especially Saudi Arabia, are desperate for pragmatism to usher in some much-needed change.
The Kingdom has essentially lost its fight against Iranian proxies. In Yemen, since 2015, it has led an expensive yet unsuccessful coalition against the Iran-backed Houthi rebels. In Syria, regardless of the bloodshed, the Assad dynasty has maintained its grasp on power. In Lebanon, Hezbollah’s influence is beyond any feasible containment and in Iraq, the Kingdom has failed to dislodge the Islamic Republic’s hold on the country’s politics. Saudi-Iranian hostilities will endure, however Riyadh understands that a foreign policy strategy turnaround is an obvious must for its security. The latter’s prosperity is crucial for Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman’s success in his Vision 2030 endeavour, an economic and social reform plan to transform the Kingdom. Thus, Saudi Arabia’s prime concern is its extraction from Yemen and the war that has plagued its developments —credibility and dignity —for years. Though the Kingdom has understood its failure to contain Iran, it is in no way surrendering to the latter, but short-term appeasement to rethink their approach could certainly be fruitful in light of Vision 2030.
The rapprochement might look like an urged Saudi response to a strategic setback; however, Iran’s domestic turmoil threatens its proxy “victories”, and it too could benefit from mended relations. Tehran could profit from a shyer Saudi hand in its unrest to restore the little stability it sporadically knows. The Kingdom had been accused of propagandising anti-regime criticism via Iran International, a TV channel based in London. The anti-Islamic Republic news outlet has played a significant role, amongst other platforms, in fuelling protests and popular uprising in Iran, most notably those sparked in September 2022. Though the channel defends its editorial independence, Tehran has requested the Saudis curb their alleged pawn. Propaganda fears aside, Iran could benefit from bilateral cooperation. The Rial has lost a third of its value this year and inflation had reached 47.7 percent in late February, needless to say Iranians have been suffering President Raisi’s vow to boost the economy without care for sanctions and nuclear agreements.
This Middle East is, in essence, experiencing a rearrangement. Adding to an unpredictable deal between two foes, Iran’s most notable proxy, Syria, attended the Arab League summit in Jeddah (KSA) in May 2023. The Kingdom’s willingness to accept Assad’s reintegration, a regime whose uprooting it had been generously financing, highlights significant changes in the region’s dynamics. Riyadh has accepted the status quo— in other words, its defeat— and is shifting its strategy. MBS is favouring a pragmatic approach to achieving regional stability rather than enduring a conflict. Saudi Arabia, along with other Gulf states, would like their states’ free from the Captagon drug, Syria’s main illegal export and Bachar’s clever bargaining weapon. Iran’s deal with Saudi Arabia announced yet another pivotal point for the Middle East, not only was Damascus back into the equation, but now Iran also wants in. Bilateral trade and cooperation is one way to pacify things, however, it is clear that, despite this new era of questionable diplomacy, the hatred and rivalries that were so overtly driving war persist. Today, we wait to see how they will manifest under these new circumstances.
All that aside, Xi’s role in negotiating this deal cannot be ignored. Once a shy actor in Middle Eastern geopolitics, China now finds itself meddling with the region’s most tense relation. China’s diplomatic success, and especially what that might entail, undoubtedly irritated Washington. The arrangement took place in Beijing, not some third-party country, which is quite telling of how the Middle kingdom wants this— and it— to be viewed. However, none of this heralds a new era of Chinese dominance in Middle Eastern affairs. Beijing is not filling an American vacuum, besides, it is quite obvious Washington could not have mended Saudi-Iranian relations. Though this makes for great PRC publicity, Beijing is ultimately doing this to ensure its own sustainability. Saudi Arabia is China’s main oil provider, supplying 17.8 percent of crude imports in 2022 , and Iran, one of China’s most crucial partners, also holds tight reins on Iraq, China’s third largest exporter supplying 10.7 percent in 2022 (oilprice). While China first and foremost ensured its own survival, it killed two birds with one stone bruising Washington’s ego.
Four months later, though too early to say, the rapprochement looks quite superficial— no surprise there. However, bilateral talk, though not abundant, has not halted. Foreign ministers from both nations met in Tehran on June 17th to discuss possible future trade, commitment to the UN Charter and reduced proliferation of WMDs. On July 5th, both Energy ministers discussed investment in the oil and gas industry and possibilities of joint ventures at the OPEC Summit in Vienna (Reuters). These efforts point to a certain commitment to diplomacy, but not much else. We know how both states feel about international law and weapons, and even more so about each other. The shallowness that we have seen in both nation’s bilateral discourse do not exactly signify a long-term commitment to trust and cooperation.
Saudi Arabia needs security to ensure safe development of its transformation, and Iran needs stability to improve its internal crises. Though both need one another in those aspects, their long term objectives contradict the core of this “rapprochement”. The Kingdom wants to be leader of the Muslim world, as does Iran, and the region’s powerhouse for all sectors, something Iranian nuclear power would obviously threaten. The region knows no previsibility and we will have to see just how temporary and shallow things are. Is an era of increased cooperation and de-escalation upon us or is this article’s mild pessimism justified in believing all this deal constitutes is a rearrangement of the tensions that we have known to tear the region and its people apart?
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own, and may not reflect the opinions of The St Andrews Economist.
Image Rights: Getty Images